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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Expediting Extraditing: The United States-
United Kingdom Supplemental
Extradition Treaty of 1986
The defenders of this Realm have worked well in secret and in the
open. They think that they have pacified Ireland. They think that
they have purchased half of us and intimidated the other half.
They think that they have foreseen everything, think that they
have provided against everything; but the fools, the fools, the fools
- they have left us our Fenian dead, and while Ireland holds these
graves, Ireland unfree shall never be at peace.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 17, 1986, the United States Senate approved a new extra-
dition treaty with the United Kingdom. 2 While it is not uncommon
for an extradition treaty to spark political debate, this particular
treaty has initiated heated discussion over issues of international and
constitutional law. The legal debate concerns the treaty's diminution
of the judiciary's traditional role in extradition law. 3 This new treaty
eliminates the "political offense" exception, a doctrine which denies
extradition for crimes committed abroad which are distinctly political
in nature.4 The treaty will make it almost obligatory for the United
States to extradite Irish Republican Army 5 members accused of crim-
inal acts against British rule in Northern Ireland. 6 Furthermore, be-
1. Padraic Pearse's funeral oration for Irish Republican hero Jeremiah O'Donovan
Rossa, reprinted in G. DANGERFIELD, THE DAMNABLE QUESTION 147 (1976).
2. S. Doc. No. 8, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S9273 (daily ed. July 17, 1986).
3. Riley, Is U.S. Playing Politics with Extradition?, NAT'L L. J., June 16, 1986, at 8, col.
1-2.
4. S. EXEC. REP. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986) [hereinafter S. EXEC. REP. 99-17].
5. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is a political organization devoted to the over-
throw of British rule in Northern Ireland. In the past, it has been known for its terrorist
activities. However, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), a splinter group of the
IRA, became dissatisfied with the growing passivism of the IRA, and has since become the
more active, as well as the more violent, group. Currently, membership in both organizations
is outlawed in the United Kingdom. See generally T. COOGAN, THE IRA (1980).
6. Extradition Treaty Passes Senate, The Irishman, Aug.-Sept. 1986, at 1, col. 1. In
1980, an Act of Parliament divided Ireland, establishing six counties in the North, which re-
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cause the treaty contains a retroactivity clause, it will allow the
extradition of suspects accused of crimes that occurred before the
treaty was ratified.
7
To some, it may not seem repugnant that persons who have been
accused of crimes in Northern Ireland should be made to stand trial
there. Yet, these suspects will face an extra-judicial system, known as
the Diplock Court, which has been specifically created to handle ter-
rorist activities. Critics of the Diplock Court have called it a "mid-
night" court system, claiming that it lacks the traditional safeguards
of due process for the accused . Irish Americans have been quite vo-
cal in their opposition to the new treaty.9 One critic has stated:
The recent passage of the Anglo-American Extradition Treaty is
one of the most blatant rejections of the founding principles of our
country .... [It is] a shameful example of foreign influence ped-
dling in the highest halls of American government. The United
States State Department was used by the Thatcher government to
spearhead an attack on the American tradition of political
asylum. 10
This Comment will analyze the Supplementary Extradition
Treaty between the United States of America and the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 1986 by reviewing the
development of the political offense exception, and the legal contro-
versy over limiting the doctrine. Then, this Comment will discuss the
treaty's retroactivity clause and its potential effect on persons whose
extradition a United States court has already denied. Finally, this
main within British domain. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 established the remaining south-
ern counties as what is now known as the Republic of Ireland, a completely independent
nation. Foley, Public Security and Individual Freedom: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland, 8
YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 284, 285 (1982). One writer summed up the conflict in this way:
In the long struggle between two cultures, Protestant English and Irish Catholic,
Gall and Gael, invader and invaded, Alien and indigene, the blame is easily assigned.
Yet, the same struggle can be seen as a profoundly human confrontation, one which
finally gave to Irish history, in the Easter Rising, one of its most heroic symbols and
to British Imperial history, in the Anglo-Irish war and Treaty, one of its saddest, yet
most illuminating chapters. It is in this kind of peace, the peace of the past, that the
Irish Revolution may one day come to rest.
G. DANGERFIELD, supra note 1, at 350. The history and controversy surrounding the Anglo-
Irish conflict are well beyond the scope of this Comment. For a thorough discussion, see G.
DANGERFIELD, supra note 1, and C. O'BRIAN, STATES OF IRELAND (1972).
7. Extradition Treaty Passes Senate, supra note 6, at 1.
8. 99th Cong. 1st Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S9260 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Bidden).
9. Extradition Treaty Passes Senate, supra note 6, at 1.
10. Id., Letter from Dr. Seamus Metress to Editor, at 4, col. 4.
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Comment will review the controversy over the Northern Irish
Diplock Court system, with the hope of determining, if indeed, the
"Senate ha[s] pulled down the Statue of Liberty . .. [and] a great
American tradition has been destroyed.""
II. CURRENT EXTRADITION LAW AND THE
POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
The political offense doctrine was established nearly 200 years ago
to provide a haven under international law for unsuccessful rebels
who fought for their freedom against established authorities in
their country and lost.
This doctrine has been carried forward in all the Western de-
mocracies until the present day.
12
Extradition is the process by which one who is charged with a
crime against the law of one State and found in a foreign State is
returned by the latter to the former for punishment.' 3 The procedure
begins when a foreign nation demands the surrender of a fugitive for
the purpose of trying and punishing him for a criminal act.14 Tradi-
tionally, the United States has recognized no obligation to extradite in
the absence of a treaty with the nation requesting extradition. 15
Where a treaty exists with the requesting nation, the accused is
brought before a federal judicial officer who must determine if there is
sufficient evidence to sustain the criminal charge under the provisions
of the treaty. 16
Most extradition treaties authorize an exception for otherwise ex-
11. Id., Statement of Paul O'Dwyer, at 1.
12. S. EXEC. REP. 99-17, supra note 4, at 14 (statement of Sen. Helms).
13. 6 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Ch. XVI § 1 (1959) [hereinafter
WHITEMAN]. See generally Comment, Unraveling the Gordian Knot: The United States Law
of Extradition and the Political Offender Exception, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L. F. 141 (1980) [here-
inafter Unraveling the Gordian Knot].
14. Bassiouni, International Extradition, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 733 (1968).
15. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933). The Court stated:
While a government may... voluntarily exercise the power to surrender a fugitive
from justice to the country from which he has fled ... the legal right to demand his
extradition and the correlative duty to surrender him to the demanding country exist
only when created by a treaty.
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1948). It is generally thought that U.S. courts simply do not
recognize asylum and extradition "as a part of customary international law." Cantrell, The
Political Offense Exemption in International Extradition: A Comparison of the United States,
Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 777, 815 (1977) [hereinafter
Cantrell]. See generally WHITEMAN, supra note 13, at 732.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976).
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traditable offenses when the alleged crime is politically motivated. 17
However, difficulty arises when one tries to determine just what con-
stitutes a "political offense." No treaty to which the United States is a
party defines the term "political offense."' 8 Thus, the determination
of which crimes may fall into the exempt category has been left to the
judiciary.
There are two major categories of political offenses: "pure" and
"relative." The pure political offense is a crime directed against a sov-
ereign state or political subdivision thereof, 19 such as treason, sedi-
tion, or espionage. 20 Such offenses lack the elements of common
crimes and do not involve private wrongs, but rather, are crimes
against a public interest. Purely political offenses are easy to identify,
in contrast to relative political offenses. Relative political offenses are
those that include a common crime in the furtherance of a political
purpose. 21 For example, a murder committed in the course of a polit-
ical protest would be a relative political offense, as it contains both a
private harm and a political purpose. Both types of political offenses
have been excepted from extradition, 22 but it has been the latter that
has caused the courts the most difficulty in their quest to determine
when the political offense exception should apply.
A. A Variety of Tests for Determining What Constitutes
a Political Offense
An examination of the various interpretations of the term "polit-
ical offense" reveals only one distinct common denominator with re-
spect to the "relative" political offense: the political motivation for the
offense must influence the perpetrator more than the general intent to
17. WHITEMAN, supra note 15, at § 15.
18. Id. See also Cantrell, supra note 15, at 815. However, many recent U.S. treaties
identify certain violent crimes which will not qualify as political offenses, such as the hijacking
of a commercial flight. See e.g., Treaty on Extradition, May 24, 1974, United States - Austra-
lia, 27 U.S.T. 957, T.I.A.S. 8234; Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 1971, United States - Canada, 27
U.S.T. 983, T.I.A.S. 8237. This is because such offenses affect the world community as a
whole, and are offensive to all mankind regardless of their motivation. Bassiouni, Ideologically
Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses Exception in Extradition - A Proposed Judicial
Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 217, 241 (1969) [hereinafter Bassiouni,
Ideologically Motivated Offenses].
19. Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses, supra note 18, at 245.
20. Id. at 245-46. See also, Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political
Offenses under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PrTT. L. REV. 65 (1964).
21. Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses, supra note 18, at 248. See also Extradi-
tion Treaty Passes Senate, supra note 6, at 1.
22. WHITEMAN, supra note 13, at 800.
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commit the common crime. 23 Beyond this, the test developed by vari-
ous nations for determining which activities fall within the political
offense exception vary in scope and analysis. A review of the tests
used by the French, Swiss, English and United States courts provides
a sampling of the three fundamental approaches for determining
when a crime is a non-extraditable political offense.
24
1. The French "Injured Rights" Test
One theory for determining when the political offense exception
should apply focuses on the injury that results from the crime. This
approach is illustrated by the French "injured rights" test.25 The
adoption of the French test can be traced to the French Extradition
Law of March 10, 1927, which provides that extradition shall be de-
nied when "the crime or offense has a political character or when it is
clear (resulte) from the circumstances that the extradition is requested
for a political end."
' 26
The French courts elaborated on the civil law in the case of Gio-
vanni Gatti.27 In that case, the Court of Appeals of Grenoble estab-
lished the French approach: the offense does not derive its political
character from the intent of the offender, but rather, from the nature
of the rights injured.28 This "injured rights" approach is a narrow
interpretation of the political offense doctrine, in that it does not allow
exemption of "relative" political crimes simply because the perpetra-
tor of the common crime alleges political intent.29 The Giovanni
court stated that:
[t]he fact that the reasons of sentiment which prompted the of-
fender to commit the offence [sic] belong to the realm of politics
does not itself create a political offence. The offence does not de-
rive its political character from the motive of the offender but from
the nature of the rights it injures. 30
23. Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses, supra note 18, at 248-49.
24. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law,
48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1239 (1962) [hereinafter Garcia-Mora].
25. Id. at 1249.
26. Law of March 10, 1927, tit. 1, art. 5, para. 2, in HARVARD RESEARCH 380-81 (Fr.)
(unofficial translation), reprinted in Garcia-Mora, supra note 24, at 1249.
27. In re Giovanni Gatti, 14 Ann. Dig. 145 (Court of Appeal of Grenoble, Fr., 1947).
28. Id. at 145-46.
29, Garcia-Mora, supra note 24, at 1249.
30. Id.
1988]
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2. The Swiss "Political Motivation" Approach
A second approach to defining a political offense focuses on the
motive of the offender, rather than on the nature of the act. In con-
trast to the "injured rights" approach, the "political motivation" test
is somewhat broader, as illustrated by Swiss law. 3' While the motive
of the offender is the court's primary concern, two additional criteria
must be met. 32 First, the common crime must have been committed
in pursuance of an attempt by the perpetrator to modify the political
organization of the state. 33 This test was summarized by the Swiss
Federal Tribunal, which stated that "acts which are not related to a
general movement directed to the realisation [sic] of a particular polit-
ical object in such a way that they themselves appear as an essential
part or incident. .. thereof" can raise no claim to the political offense
doctrine. 34 The second limit on the political motivation test is that
the political motive must predominate the intent to commit the com-
mon crime. 35 Thus, acts which are so heinous as to be completely out
of proportion to the end sought will not trigger the political offense
exception. 36 The courts of Germany, Brazil, Chile, and Italy have
adopted variations of the political motivation test.
37
3. The British/United States "Political Incidence" Test
The broadest interpretation of the political offense doctrine
seems to be the "political incidence" test adopted by Great Britain
and the United States. 38 The seminal case of In re Castioni,39 decided
by the House of Lords in 1891, held that "fugitive criminals are not to
be surrendered for extradition crimes, if those crimes were incidental
to and formed a part of political disturbances." 4° Castioni establishes
a two-pronged test for determining which acts qualify for the political
offense exception. First, the act must be committed during a political
disturbance, involving a group of which the accused is a member; and
second, the act must be one of political violence committed by the
31. Id. at 1251.
32. Id. at 1253.
33. Id.
34. In re Ockert, 1 Ann. Dig. 369, 370 (Fed. Trib. Swisse, 1930).
35. Garcia-Mora, supra note 24, at 1254.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1255-56.
38. Id. at 1244.
39. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
40. Id. at 150.
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accused for a political end. 41 The term "political end" was later de-
termined to require "two or more parties in the State, each seeking to
impose the Government of their own choice on the other .... [I]f the
offense is committed by one side or the other in pursuance of that
object, it is a political offense, otherwise, not."' 42 The Castioni test is
the basis for the test that has been developed by United States
courts.
4 3
The British courts seem to apply the Castioni test more flexibly
than the United States judiciary. 44 In the case of In re Kolczynski, 45
seven Polish crew members of a fishing vessel decided to seek asylum
in England. They forcefully overtook the ship, injuring one man who
attempted to resist, and docked the ship in a British port. The Polish
government requested their extradition, and charged them with the
common crimes of using force, wounding a member of the crew, and
revolting on board ship.46 All of these crimes were extraditable ac-
cording to the terms of the United Kingdom-Polish Extradition
Treaty of 1932.47 Denying extradition on the basis that the escape
was a political offense, 48 the court stated:
[n]ow a state of totalitarianism prevails in some parts of the world
and it is a crime for citizens in such places to take steps to leave.
In this case the members of the crew ... were under political su-
pervision and they revolted by the only means open to them ....
[I]f they were surrendered there could be no doubt that, while they
would be tried for the particular offense mentioned, they would be
punished as for a political crime.4
9
The court also noted that the offense in question "must always be
considered according to the circumstances existing at the time."50
The Kolczynski opinion seems to indicate that the political offense ex-
ception is, in the words of Hugo Grotius, "for the benefit of those who
41. Comment, American Courts and Modern Terrorism: The Politics of Extradition, 13
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 617, 625 (1981) [hereinafter Politics of Extradition].
42. In re Meunier, [1984] 2 Q.B. 415, 419.
43. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), stated "American cases have
more or less adopted language used in Castioni." Id. at 203 (footnote omitted), vacated and
remanded for further proceedings under 18 US.C. § 3184, 355 U.S. 393 (1958).
44. Garcia-Mora, supra note 24, at 1244.
45. [1955] 1 Q.B. 540.
46. Id. at 543.
47. Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 11, 1932, United Kingdom-Poland, Art. 3 [1934] 11 Bev-
ans 206, T.S. 789, 46 Stat. 2282.
48. In re Kolczynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540 at 549 (Cassels, J.).
49. Id.
50. Id.
19881
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suffer from undeserved enmity, not those who have done something
that is injurious to human society." 51
Ireland follows the rule of Kolczynski, but places a greater em-
phasis on the probability that the accused will face political persecu-
tion if extradited.52 In the case of State (Magee) v. O'Rourke,5 3 the
court followed the principles of Castioni,54 but allowed greater defer-
ence to the individual facts of the case.55 Because Magee presented
evidence that he would face political persecution for common crimes
he had committed in Northern Ireland if extradited to that State, and
since Northern Ireland refused to present contrary evidence, Magee
was exempted from extradition to Northern Ireland.
56
The United States adopted the Castioni test in In re Ezeta .57 In
Ezeta, the acting President of Salvador had taken refuge on a United
States ship while fleeing from revolutionary forces who had taken up
arms against the government of Salvador. The new regime sought the
extradition of Ezeta to face charges for murder and robbery. The
court found that Ezeta could properly invoke the political offense ex-
ception, stating:
The testimony shows that [the crimes] were all committed during
the progress of actual hostilities between the contending forces,
wherein Gen[eral] Ezeta and his companions were seeking to main-
tain the authority of the then existing government against the ac-
tive operations of a revolutionary uprising. With the merits of this
strife I have nothing to do.
58
However, subsequent United States interpretations of the polit-
ical offense exception have failed to follow the more liberal view taken
by Great Britain in Kolczynski. In Karadzole v. Artukovic,59 the court
denied an extradition request made by Yugoslavia for a former gov-
ernment official accused of committing "mass slaughters of the peace-
ful civilian populations of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina."
6
Relying on the two-part test established in Castioni, and recognizing
51. GROTIus, DE JURE Ac PAClS LIBRIS TRES 530 (Kelsey trans. 1925).
52. Cantrell, supra note 15, at 800.
53. State (Magee) v. O'Rourke, [1971] I. R. 205.
54. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149; see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
55. Cantrell, supra note 15, at 801.
56. Id. at 800-01.
57. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
58. Id. at 997.
59. 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded for further proceedings under 18
U.SC. §3184, 355 U.S. 393 (1958).
60. Id. at 204.
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that the event took place during a political disturbance, the court
found that the alleged crimes constituted political offenses. 61 The Ar-
turovik opinion has been sharply criticized, 62 and illustrates that an
inflexible interpretation of the Castioni test may result in a broad ap-
plication of the political offense exception, "result[ing] in asylum for
offenders whose motives do not merit humanitarian protection be-
cause they may not be genuinely political.
'63
B. Recent Developments in United States Interpretation of the
Political Offense Exception Regarding Crimes Against
British Rule in Northern Ireland
In three cases where the political incidence test has been applied,
the United States judiciary has denied United Kingdom requests for
extradition of members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army ac-
cused of common crimes. 64 In a fourth case, Quinn v. Robinson,65 the
defendant was found extraditable, but a petition for Writ of Certiorari
was filed with the United States Supreme Court on July 2, 1986.66
When Congress debated the Supplemental Extradition Treaty Be-
tween the United States of America and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Senator Richard G. Lugar stated
that "it was because of these cases that on June 25, 1985, the United
States and the United Kingdom signed the Supplementary Extradi-
tion [Treaty]. Its purpose is to reverse the three cases where extradi-
tion was denied and put an end to this development in the law."'6
7
A review of these cases reveals that the broad interpretation
given to the political offense exception by the courts could signal to
the rest of the world that the United States is a haven for persons who
commit acts of terrorism in Northern Ireland.
1. In re Mackin
In the case of In re Mackin,68 Judge Friendly of the Second Cir-
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Garcia-Mora, supra note 24, at 1248, and Green, Political Offenses, War
Crimes and Extradition, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 329, 333 (1962).
63. Politics of Extradition, supra note 41, at 628.
64. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491
(2d Cir. 1986); In re McMullen, Magistrate No. 3-70-1099 MG (Memorandum decision)
(N.D. Cal. 1979), reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. S9146 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
65. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
66. 132 CONG. REC. S9120 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
67. Id. at S9147.
68. 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
1988]
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cuit Court of Appeals affirmed a New York magistrate's decision that
Mackin's crimes fell within the political offense exception. The gov-
erning extradition treaty provided that: "(1) Extradition shall not be
granted if:... (c)(i) the offense for which extradition is requested is
regarded by the requested party as one of a political character .... ",69
Mackin was arrested in Northern Ireland and charged with at-
tempted murder of a British soldier, wounding him with the intent to
do serious bodily harm, and illegal possession of firearms. Mackin
was released on bail, but failed to appear for his trial. Mackin fled to
the United States, where he was apprehended by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. 70 Citing Castioni7' and Ezeta72, among other
cases, the magistrate stated that the political offense exception extends
to relative political offenses, "to wit, crimes against persons or prop-
erty which are incidental to war, revolution or political uprising at the
time and site of the commission of the offense."' 73 By applying the
traditional British/United States political incidence test, the magis-
trate found that at the time of the offenses allegedly committed by
Mackin, the Provisional Irish Republican Army74 was involved in an
uprising in Northern Ireland, and that the offenses committed against
the British soldier were incidental to Mackin's role as a member of the
Provisional Irish Republican Army.75
The Mackin case presents another interesting issue. On appeal,
the government argued that whether an offense falls within the polit-
ical offense exemption is a matter that should be committed exclu-
sively to the executive branch.76 Judge Friendly responded to this
argument by first noting that federal law has consistently upheld the
principle that whether or not an alleged crime is a political offense is a
question solely within the province of the judicial officer before whom
the fugitive is brought. 77 Then, Judge Friendly pointed out that as he
69. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. 8468.
70. 668 F.2d at 124.
71. In re Castioni [1890] 1 Q.B. 149.
72. In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
73. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 1981).
74. See supra note 5.
75. 668 F.2d at 125.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 136. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Aristegueita, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 914 (1962); Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981); In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (dicta); Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F.
Supp. 717 (S.D. N.Y. 1963).
[Vol. 10:135
Supplemental Extradition Treaty
wrote the opinion, a bill was before the United States Senate which
would remove from the court's jurisdiction the power to determine
when an offender's act fell within the protection afforded by the polit-
ical offense doctrine. 78 Accompanying the bill was a legal memoran-
dum which proposed that the bill was necessary since under present
case law, the courts have the only authority to determine whether an
extradition request may be denied because the charged crime is polit-
ical in nature.79 Judge Friendly then concluded:
[a]s the law now stands, both the judicial and the executive
branches have recognized that . . . [the] decision whether a case
falls within the political offense exception is for the judicial officer.
The Government cites to us no overriding principle which dictates
a contrary result .... While the policy arguments made by the
Government are not without force, particularly in an age of terror-
ism, they are not so overwhelming as to justify us in concluding
that [the judiciary should not] decide whether the offense for which
extradition is sought is political.80
The opinion in Mackin seems to indicate that even the judiciary
has become aware that the broad interpretation given to the political
offense doctrine by United States courts has the potential for terrorist
abuse. However, the Mackin opinion does not anticipate the remedy
that the United States Senate has elected in ratifying the Supplemen-
tal Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. By
designating specifically extraditable crimes not subject to the protec-
tion of the political offense doctrine the treaty strips the court of the
authority to determine when the political offense exception applies.
8'
2. United States v. Doherty
Judge Friendly ruled in an almost identical manner in the case of
United States v. Doherty.12 The facts of the Doherty case were similar
to those in Mackin, but resulted in more serious injuries to the vic-
tims. In 1980, Doherty, at the direction of the Irish Republican
Army, took over a private home in Belfast. He held the owner and
78. Matter of Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 136 (2d Cir. 1981).
79. Id. at 136-37.
80. Id. at 136.
81. Supplemental Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, art. 1, S. ExEC. REP. 99-17, supra
note 4.
82. 786 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986).
1988]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
his family hostage as a part of an operation to ambush a group of
British soldiers. A few hours later, a car pulled up in front of the
house, and five members of the British Army emerged, armed with
machine guns. In an exchange of gunfire, one British soldier was
killed. Doherty was arrested and charged with murder, attempted
murder, illegal possession of firearms, and with belonging to the Irish
Republican Army, an outlawed organization. 83 After his trial, but
prior to the final decision in his case, Doherty escaped from prison
and fled to the United States. The magistrate reviewing Doherty's
case determined that the offenses committed during the ambush and
the prison escape were political in character, and therefore, consti-
tuted political offenses. 84 Again, Judge Friendly upheld the magis-
trate's decision. 85
3. Matter of Peter Gabriel John McMullen
In the Matter of Peter Gabriel John McMullen, 86 the court found
that the defendant's activities came within the political offense exclu-
sion provided in the extradition treaty then in force between the
United States and the United Kingdom.87 The magistrate applied the
traditional test of In re Castioni,88 stating that:
[t]he political offense crime must be incidental to or formed as a
part of a political disturbance and committed as furthering a polit-
ical uprising. Even though the offense be deplorable and heinous,
the criminal actor will be excluded from deportation if the crime is
committed under these pre-requisites. 89
The United Kingdom sought McMullen's extradition to try him
for the bombing of Claro Barracks, a British military installation. On
behalf of Great Britain, the United States government argued that
McMullen's bombing of the barracks was personally motivated, and
isolated from the then-current Provisional Irish Republican Army
terrorist campaign. Finding that McMullen had been a member of
the Provisional Irish Republican Army in 1974, and further reasoning
83. Id. at 493.
84. Id. at 494.
85. Id. at 503.
86. In re McMullen, Magistrate No. 3-70-1099 MG (memorandum decison) (N.D. Cal
1979).
87. Id. (citing Article Vl(c)(1) of the Extradition Treaty June 8, 1972, United States-
United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. 8468).
88. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
89. In re McMullen, Magistrate No. 3-70-1099 MG (memorandum decision) (N.D. Cal.
1979).
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that bombing a military barracks is not likely to be a product of per-
sonal motivation, the magistrate concluded that:
[t]he defendant has established by evidence, which we must con-
clude as preponderating that the act of bombing the Claro Bar-
racks was political in character. Thus, all the two requisites of
establishing the political offense exception of the treaty having been
met, we find that Peter Gabriel John McMullen is not extraditable
90
4. Quinn v. Robinson
The trend towards a broad interpretation of the political offense
exception with regard to crimes committed by the Irish was halted in
the case of Quinn v. Robinson.91 The facts of the Quinn case were
shocking enough to provide the court with an appropriate situation in
which to limit the application of the doctrine. In 1981, the United
Kingdom requested Quinn's extradition to face charges for the mur-
der of a police constable, Stephen Tibble and conspiracy to cause ex-
plosions of the kind likely to endanger human life. The magistrate's
decision focused on six incidents. In 1974, Quinn's fingerprints were
found on the wrapping of a hollowed-out bible containing a bomb,
which was mailed to and received by Bishop Gerard William Tickle.
At the time, Tickle was the Roman Catholic Bishop to the British
Armed Forces. Fortunately, the bomb was defused without causing
any harm.92
Quinn's fingerprints appeared that same year on three other let-
ter-type bombs. One was sent to the home of a British Treasury attor-
ney, and another, to the chairman of the Daily Express Newspaper in
90. Id. However, in 1980, McMullen's petition for asylum in the United States was de-
nied by the United States Board of Immigration Appeals. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986), holding that McMullen was ineligible for withholding
of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). The court found that the PIRA's random acts of
violence against ordinary citizens of Ireland were not sufficiently related to the organization's
political objectives and therefore, constituted serious non-political crimes for the purpose of a
deportation decision. Id. at 596. The court went on to state:
[i]n addition, we reject McMullen's argument that we should find him eligible for
withholding of deportation because the magistrate in his extradition proceeding
found his acts to be political offenses' under the treaty. That a magistrate earlier
found McMullen's acts to be political offenses for purposes of denying extradition
does not affect the [Board of Immigration Appeals'] contrary finding . . . because
extradition determinations have no res judicata effect in subsequent judicial
proceedings.
Id. at 597.
91. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
92. Id.
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London. Both packages partially exploded as they were opened, se-
verely injuring the attorney and the chairman's security officer. The
third bomb was found on the steps of a London diner, and was
defused before it exploded.
93
The fingerprints of Quinn's alleged co-conspirators were found
on the wrappings of two other bomb packages. One package was
found in a public foyer at the Aldershot Railway Station in Hamp-
shire County, England. The other was discovered in an attache case
in the entrance hall of the Kings Arms Public House in Warminister,
England. Both explosives were defused.
94
The magistrate presiding over Quinn's extradition hearing held
that in order to establish non-extraditability under the political of-
fense exception, Quinn must first show a violent political uprising,
and second, that he was a member of the group revolting, and finally,
that his activities were in furtherance of the uprising. The magistrate
concluded that Quinn had established the first element, but failed
with regard to the latter two. 95 The United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Judicial Circuit, agreed, but vacated and remanded to the dis-
trict court to determine whether the conspiracy charge was time-
barred.
96
In a lengthy opinion, the court traced the history of the political
offense exception, and noted the discord among international and na-
tional courts in applying the doctrine.97 However, Judge Reinhardt
concluded that:
[t]here is no need to create a new mechanism for defining "political
offenses" in order to ensure that the two important objectives we
have been considering have been met: (a) that international ter-
rorists will be subject to extradition, and (b) that the exception will
continue to cover the type of domestic revolutionary conduct that
inspired its creation in the first place....
The incidence test has served us well and requires no signifi-
cant modification. The growing problem of international terror-
ism, serious as it is, does not compel us to reconsider or redefine
93. Id. at 783-88.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 818.
97. Id. at 792-818. Specifically, the court stated that "[t]he recent lack of consensus
among United States courts confronted with requests for the extradition of those accused of
violent political acts committed outside the context of an organized military conflict reflects
some confusion about the purposes underlying the political offense exception." Id. at 803.
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the test.98
III. PROVISIONS OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL EXTRADITION TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND
[S]ome things in life we do because they are expedient. Some
things we do because they serve our own interests. Some things we
do because they obstruct the path of others. The ratification of this
treaty is something we should do simply because it is right.99
The Supplemental Extradition Treaty eliminates the political of-
fense exception for matters between the United States and Great Brit-
ain, and "with it, the traditional role of U.S. courts to deny
extradition in connection with alleged political offenses."' ° The new
treaty provides that Northern Irish persons accused of committing
certain crimes against British rule will no longer be able to flee to the
United States and claim the political offense doctrine as their
defense. 10
98. Id. at 806.
99. 132 CONG. REC. S9258 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (comment of Sen. Mathias).
100. 132 CONG. REC. S9149 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Pell).
101. Supplemental Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reprinted at S. EXEC. REP. 99-17,
supra note 4. The relevant provisions of the treaty are:
Article 1
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following shall be regarded as
an offense of a political character:
(a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the obligation pursuant
to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the person sought or submit his
case to their competent authorities for decision as to prosecution;
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily harm;
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking a
hostage;
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or
parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if its use endangers any person; and
(e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participation as an
accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offense.
Article 2
Nothing in this Supplementary Treaty shall be interpreted as imposing the obligation
to extradite if the judicial authority of the requested Party determines that the evi-
dence of criminality presented is not sufficient to sustain the charge under the provi-
sions of the treaty. The evidence of criminality must be such as, according to the law
of the requested Party, would justify committal for trial if the offense had been com-
mitted in the territory of the requested party.
In determining whether an individual is extraditable from the United States, the judi-
cial authority of the United States shall permit the individual sought to present evi-
dence on the questions of whether:
(1) there is probable cause;
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A. Article 1: What is Not a Political Offense
Subpart (a) of Article 1 of the Supplemental Extradition Treaty
excludes from the political offense exception certain acts enumerated
in four multilateral conventions. 0 2 Under these multilateral conven-
tions, the United States and United Kingdom have agreed to either
extradite or try a suspect sought for a listed offense.' 0 3 The offenses
covered by these conventions include certain takings of hostages, hi-
jacking of aircraft and crimes against diplomats. 104 Subpart (b) elimi-
nates the political offense exception for voluntary manslaughter and
murder. 0 5 Offenses involving kidnapping, abduction or taking of a
hostage not covered by a multilateral convention are excluded by sub-
(2) a defense to extradition specified in the Extradition Treaty or this Supplementary
Treaty, and within the jurisdiction of the courts, exists; and
(3) the act upon which the request for extradition is based would constitute an of-
fense punishable under the laws of the United States.
Article 3
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplemental Treaty, extradi-
tion shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of the compe-
tent judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request for
extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on account of his
race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be
prejudiced at his trial, or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by
reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.
(b) In the United States, the competent judicial authority shall only consider
the defense to extradition set forth in paragraph (a) for offenses listed in Article 1 of
this Supplementary Treaty. A finding under paragraph (a) shall be immediately ap-
pealable by either party to the United States district court, or court of appeals, as
appropriate ....
Article 5
This Supplementary Treaty shall apply to any offense committed before or after this
Supplementary Treaty enters into force, provided that this Supplementary Treaty
shall not apply to an offense committed before this Supplementary Treaty enters into
force which was not an offense under the laws of both the Contracting Parties at the
time of its commission.
102. Id. art. 1(a).
103. Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, S. EXEC. REP. 99-17, supra note 4. The conventions that apply are as fol-
lows: The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signa-
ture at The Hague on 16 December 1970; The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Montreal on 23 September
1971; The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature at New York on 14
December 1973; The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for
signature at New York on 18 December 1979. Id. at 6-7.
104. Id. at 7.
105. Id. "Subpart (b) covers serious violent crimes against the person. The term 'volun-
tary manslaughter' is intended to cover crimes which have been held by the U.K. courts to be
manslaughter and which in many U.S. courts would amount to second degree murder." Id.
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part (c).' 0 6 Any crime involving the use of explosives, which endan-
gers human life, will not be subject to the political offense doctrine. ,07
Finally, subpart (e) incorporates the exclusion to cover attempts and
accomplices. 08
B. Article 2: Announcement of Existing Law
Article 2 of the Supplemental Extradition Treaty is simply "a
distillation of settled U.S. law."' 1 9 It reaffirms that one who is
brought before a federal judge or magistrate is permitted to present
evidence relevant to the extradition request. 10 Since an extradition
hearing is much like a criminal arraignment, the issue before the court
is whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a charge under the
applicable extradition treaty, and is not an ultimate determination of
innocence or guilt. '
C. Article 3: An Announced Standard for Showing Political
Persecution if the Accused is Extradited
to the United Kingdom
Article 3(a) requires that if a person accused of a crime enumer-
ated in Article 1 wishes to establish that he will face substantially
unfair treatment upon extradition to the United Kingdom, he must
meet a "preponderance of the evidence" standard."12 The Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations characterized Article 3(a) as con-
taining two related, yet distinct, concepts:
first, it authorizes a court to deny extradition based upon a perva-
sive factual showing that the requesting party has trumped-up
106. Art. 1(c), reprinted at S. EXEC. REP. 99-17, supra note 4.
107. Id. art. l(d).
108. Id. art. l(e).
109. S. EXEC. REP. 99-17, supra note 4, at 7.
110. Supplemental Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, art. 2, reprinted at S. EXEC. REP. 99-
17, supra note 4, at 16.
111. Id.; see also, Analysis, S. EXEC. REP. 99-17, supra note 4, at 7, stating:
It is fundamental that in an extradition hearing the issue before the court is
probable cause, not the ultimate guilt or innocence of the person. The purpose of the
extradition hearing is to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to bind the
individual over for trial, or to return him or her to complete an outstanding sentence
in the requesting country. In the former situation, it is the function of the requesting
state to resolve at trial the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.
Id.
112. Supplemental Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, art. 3(a), reprinted at S. EXEC. REP.
99-17, supra note 4, at 16.
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charges against a dissident in order to obtain his extradition for
trial or punishment. Second, it authorizes a court to deny extradi-
tion if the person sought for extradition can establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he would be prejudiced at his trial, or
punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty because of
his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions. 113
It should be noted that Article 3(b) limits the scope of Article
3(a) in the United States extradition proceedings to those offenses
listed in Article 1.114 The significance of this limitation is that if the
United Kingdom requests the extradition of a person accused of a
crime not listed in Article 1, the accused will not be permitted to
invoke Article 3(a) before the United State courts. 115 Furthermore,
Article 3(b) provides that both the accused and the requesting nation
may appeal any finding pursuant to Article 3(a).1
1 6
D. The Retroactivity Clause
Article 5 of the Supplemental Extradition Treaty makes offenses
committed before, as well as after the Treaty commences, subject to
its provisions." 7 The retroactivity provision does not apply to acts
which were, at the time they were committed, not considered crimes
under both the laws of the United States and the United Kingdom. 818
113. S. EXEC. REP. 99-17, supra note 4, at 4. Senator Bidden offered this explanation:
Let me make sure as part of this colloquy that I understand the nature of the rule of
inquiry into the justice system in Northern Ireland that we are establishing here.
My understanding is this: That notwithstanding that probable cause has been
established in an American Court; notwithstanding that the accused is the person
sought; notwithstanding that it is an extraditable offense under the terms of this
[Supplemental Extradition Treaty]; and notwithstanding that otherwise it is an of-
fense for which extradition would lie; and notwithstanding that it is an offense for
which the political offense doctrine would not otherwise apply; notwithstanding all of
that, The defendant will have an opportunity in Federal court to introduce evidence
that he or she personally, because of their race, religion, nationality, or political opin-
ion, not be able to get a fair trial because of the court system or any other aspect of
the judicial system in the requesting country, or that person's extradition has been
requested with a view to try to punish them on account of their race, their religion,
nationality, or political opinion.
Discussion between Senators Kerry and Trible, reprinted in Id. at 5. The Chairman, Senator
Trible, replied, "[m]y answer is yes." Id.
114. Supplemental Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, art. 3(a), reprinted in S. EXEC. REP.
99-17, supra note 4, at 7-8.
115. S. EXEC. REP. 99-17, supra note 4, at 5.
116. Supplemental Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, art. 3(b), reprinted in S. EXEC. REP.
99-17, supra note 4, at 8.
117. Id. art. 5.
118. Id.
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IV. CRITICISMS OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL EXTRADITION TREATY
A. Separation of Powers Concerns
The Supplemental Extradition Treaty has caused considerable
controversy among legal scholars as to who should determine when
the political offense exception may be invoked. One opponent of the
treaty argues that the "political offense treaty exceptions reflect a con-
stitutionally mandated function of the judiciary .... Attaching legal
labels to facts is not an executive or legislative determination - - it's a
judicial function."' 19
Proponents of the treaty disagree, and argue that because the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches are ultimately responsible for United
States foreign policy, these branches are in a better position to deter-
mine when a political controversy abroad should be recognized by the
United States. 120 Another authority denies that the separation of
powers are threatened: "[t]he new treaty simply defines the law, then
the courts apply it. There is no court-stripping at all."'
' 21
Because the treaty categorically excludes certain crimes of vio-
lence from the political offense doctrine, it abolishes the tradition of
allowing the courts to distinguish between political rebels and violent
terrorists on a case-by-case analysis.
The debate over who should consider requests for extradition
was the topic of much controversy in Congress at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. 22  In 1795 the United States Supreme Court
made its determination that the judiciary was best suited to handle
initial extradition requests. 123 The Jeffersonian Republicans also fa-
119. Riley, Is the US. Playing Politics with Extradition?, NAT'L L.J., June 16, 1986, at 8,
col. 1 (interviewing Alfred P. Rubin, Professor of International Law at the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy).
120. Id. at 8, col. 2 (interviewing Richard E. Messick, chief majority counsel to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee).
121. Id. at 8, col. 2 (quoting Professor Steven Lubet of the Northwestern University
School of Law).
122. See generally, 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, passim (1800).
123. United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42 (1795). In that case, a motion was
made by the United States Attorney General for a-rule to show cause why a writ of Mandamus
should not be issued to Judge Lawrence of the District Court of New York to compel him to
issue a warrant for apprehending Captain Barre, a Frenchman accused of deserting the French
Ship "Le Pedrix." The Vice Consulate of the French Republic had requested extradition
pursuant to the Consular Convention between the United States and France. Under that Con-
vention, certain standards of proof had to be met to trigger extradition, including evidence
sufficient to convince the judge of a ship's registry. Judge Lawrence did not consider the evi-
dence offered by the French "to be the kind of proof designated by the 9th article of the
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vored the judicial branch. 124 However, while the Federalists thought
the executive branch was the proper branch for deciding initial extra-
dition requests, even John Marshall approved of judicial review over
an executive decision by writ of habeas corpus. 25
The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842126 carved out a special
role for the judiciary in extradition proceedings, 127 by authorizing
judges to conduct a hearing on the sufficiency of evidence offered in
support of extradition. 28 If the judge or magistrate found that suffi-
cient evidence existed to justify arrest under the laws of the jurisdic-
tion from which the accused was requested, he was to issue a warrant
for the arrest of the accused.129 Congress elaborated upon this ap-
proach in 1948,130 when the first United States extradition statute
vested federal courts with the authority to conduct hearings on the
evidence of criminality pursuant to an extradition request.13 1  The
same procedural framework has been maintained in the modem
Convention." Id. at 44. The United States Supreme Court upheld Judge Lawrence's decision,
stating that:
[b]y the Act of Congress... the District Judge is appointed by the competent judge,
for the purpose expressed in the 9th article of the Convention; the consul applied to
him as such; the judge refused to issue his warrant, because, in his opinion, the evi-
dence required by the article was not produced. The act of issuing the warrant is
judicial, and not ministerial; and the refusal to issue it for want of legal proof, was the
exercise of judicial authority.
Id.
124. See generally 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, passim (1800).
125. 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 615 (1800), wherein Marshall approved of judicial review
in the case of United States v. Robbins, 27 F. Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1700) (No. 16,175). Pursuant
to the extradition article of the Jay Treaty of 1794, Robbins was sought by Great Britain for
murder and mutiny aboard a British vessel. Robbins was surrendered for extradition through
diplomatic channels, then he applied for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 829. The writ was
surrendered to the British. Id. at 832. See Unraveling the Gordian Knot, supra note 13, at 146.
126. Treaty to Settle Boundaries, Suppress Slave Trade, and Surrender Fugitives (Web-
ster-Ashburton Treaty), Aug. 9, 1842, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119.
127. Id. art. X.
128. Specifically, the treaty provides that:
the respective judges and other magistrates of the two Governments shall have
power, jurisdiction, and authority, upon complaint made under oath, to issue a war-
rant for the apprehension of the fugitive or other person so charged, that he may be
brought before such judges or other magistrates, respectively, to the end that the
evidence of criminality may be heard and considered, and if on such hearing, the
evidence be deemed sufficient to sustain the charge, it shall be the duty of the examin-
ing judge or magistrate to certify the same to the proper executive authority, that a
warrant may issue for the surrender of such fugitive.
Id.
129. Id.
130. Act of Aug. 12, 1848, Chapter 167, 9 Stat. 302.
131. Id.
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statute. 13 2
Since most of the extradition treaties to which the United States
is a party contain some type of political offense exception,'33 the court
has used its authority to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether or not that defense applies. For example, in Ex Parte
Kaine,134 United States Supreme Court Justice Samuel Nelson, riding
circuit in New York, judicially exempted political offenses from extra-
dition, despite the absence of such an exclusionary clause in the treaty
or specific statutory authority. 135 Supporters of this view contend
that "decisions involving foreign demands for the extradition of polit-
ical activists belong to the courts because they involve human liberty.
Central to the American concept of liberty is freedom from political
persecution for all persons under the protection of our laws and
Constitution."136
The prohibition against arbitrary banishment or surrender can be
found in the constitutional provisions for the writ of habeas corpus. 13 7
The writ of habeas corpus has its origins in the English Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679,138 which denied the King the right to arbitrarily
imprison or banish a suspected criminal. This Act established the ac-
cused's right to petition a court, not to determine his guilt or inno-
cence, but rather, to determine the legality of his detention or
expulsion. 139 Thus, the argument may be made that the constitu-
tional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus entrusts to the courts the
obligation to determine when the political offense exception should
apply. 140 Thus, since the new treaty may not violate distinct constitu-
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1979).
133. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
134. Ex Parte Kaine, 14 F. Cas. 79, at 81-82 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853) (No. 7,597).
135. Id.
136. Supplemental Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Hearings on Senate Treaty Document
99-8 before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.,
(1985) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (Statement of Professor Christopher H. Pyle, Mount Hol-
yoke College, Department of Politics) at 115.
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7-8.
138. 31 Car. II, C.2. This is the original habeas corpus act, and is "regarded as the great
constitutional guaranty of personal liberty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 363 (5th ed. 1983).
139. 31 Car. II, C.2.
140. Senate Hearing, supra note 136 (citing United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. 42 (1795)
and In re Kaine, 14 F. Cas. 79). Professor Pyle argues that had the treaty provisions not
provided for the political offense exception, the courts would have ruled that the Constitution
required them to determine that a crime was not extraditable if it was politically motivated.
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tional guarantees,14 ' it can be argued that the treaty must be stricken
as violative of the United States Constitution.
Yet, such an argument is not convincing. The United States
Constitution vests Congress with the power to confer jurisdiction on
the lower federal courts. 42 Furthermore, a validly-enacted treaty has
the same effect as a validly enacted statute, 143 and when conflict arises
between an act of Congress and a valid treaty, the "last expression of
the sovereign" will control.144 Therefore, if Congress may grant juris-
diction pursuant to a treaty, Congress most surely may withdraw ju-
risdiction under a treaty.
45
The courts themselves have recognized that they have a quite
limited role in the determination of extraditability. 146 In Peroff v.
Hylton, 147 the court stated that:
[a]lthough limited judicial review is available by way of a peti-
tion for habeas corpus relief, matters involving extradition have
traditionally been entrusted to the broad discretion of the executive
.... The need for flexibility in the exercise of Executive discretion
is heightened in international extradition proceedings which neces-
sarily implicate the foreign policy interests of the United States.
Thus, while Congress has provided that extraditability shall be de-
termined in the first instance by a judge or magistrate, 18 U.S.C.
3184, the ultimate decision to extradite is 'ordinarily a matter
within the exclusive purview of the Executive.
' 14
Furthermore, the courts have recognized that "[t]he fact that the
United States participates in the arguable denial of a constitutional
protection by surrendering the defendant to the demanding nation
does not implicate the United States in an unconstitutional action."'
49
Despite the questionable legality of excluding certain crimes
141. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). In that case, the court stated that "no agreement
with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress or on any other branch of Govern-
ment, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution." Id. at 16.
142. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
143. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 168 (1978).
144. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
145. But cf Senate Hearing, supra note 136, Appendix A at 288-92 (Statement of Cherif
Bassiouni). Bassiouni argues that the exclusion of "intentional crimes" from the political of-
fense doctrine does not violate the Constitution, while asserting that the treaty's systematic
exclusion of "ordinary crimes of violence" violates the equal protection argument of the 5th
Amendment.
146. Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 499 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
147. 563 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1977).
148. Id. at 1102 (quoting Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 499 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
149. United States v. Galanis, 429 F. Supp. 1215, 1218 (D.C. Conn. 1977).
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from the political offense exception, one must question the wisdom
of doing so. First, it may be argued that the Supplemental Extradi-
tion Treaty's categorical exclusion of "international" crimes 150 is un-
necessary because such crimes are already extraditable under other
multilateral treaties that bind the United States. 5 1 Second, by cate-
gorically excluding certain crimes from the political offense exception,
the Senate manifests a lack of confidence in the ability of the judicial
branch to determine, on a case-by-case basis, when a person should
not be extradited because the crime of which he is accused was moti-
vated by political ideals. 152 Finally, altering the political offense ex-
ception on a treaty-by-treaty basis implies special relationships with
certain countries, and provides the potential for inconsistent policies
and processes for extradition requests.
153
Yet, the recent increase in violent international terrorist activity
indicates a need for this new treaty. The Supplemental Extradition
Treaty signals to the rest of the world that the United States is willing
to work with its democratic allies to combat the problem of interna-
tional terrorism. Specifically, the Treaty increases the likelihood that
if a person commits a violent crime in one country and then escapes to
another, he or she will be returned to the former to stand trial there.
Article 1 of the treaty specifically excludes certain violent crimes from
the political offense doctrine. 154 A comparison of the various tests for
what constitutes a political offense reveals inconsistency and ambigu-
ity. 155 Furthermore, United States courts seem to have trouble distin-
guishing between the terrorist and the person who deserves the
protection of the political offense exception. 156 Finally, the courts do
not have a good record for extradition of Irish Republican Army
members who commit violent crimes against British rule in Northern
Ireland,15 7 because such persons have been able to escape extradition
150. Supplemental Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, art. 1, reprinted in S. EXEC. REP. 99-
17, supra note 4.
151. Senate Hearing, supra note 136, Appendix A at 300 (statement of Professor
Bassiouni).
152. Id.
153. Id. Bassiouni suggests that a better method for proscribing the limits of the political
offense exception is by legislation. Id. However, such an attempt to eliminate the defense by
statute failed in 1981. See Senate Hearing, supra note 136 (statement of Professor Pyle), and
127 CONG. REC. S9955-9961, (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1981).
154. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 23-59 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 59-82 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 60-83 and accompanying text.
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by asserting that their acts fell within the political offense exception.
This indicates to the rest of the world, albeit erroneously, that the
United States supports the Irish Republican Army's terrorist cam-
paigns. The Supplemental Extradition Treaty clears up ambiguity
and closes loopholes in the extradition process by stating that certain
violent crimes will no longer be treated as political.15 8
This is not to say that the United States should abandon the tra-
dition of providing a haven for those persons who face persecution in
their homeland because of dearly held political or religious beliefs.
Such traditions run deep in our democratic ideals. However, it must
be recognized that the United Kingdom is also a democracy, and in a
democracy, violence should not be excused or considered part of the
normal political process. As one proponent of executive discretion in
application of the political offense exception stated, "to even permit
courts in the United States to consider political motives as justifying
murder or other violent crimes show[s] a lack of respect for the demo-
cratic process. Where an individual can bring about change through
the ballot box, the bomb and the bullet have no place."' 59
B. Retroactivity
Other critics of the Supplemental Extradition Treaty are con-
cerned about the retroactivity provision. When the treaty was de-
bated on the floor of the United States Senate, one opponent of Article
5 stated that:
[a]pproving this treaty in its present form may well result in the
extradition of certain individuals who American courts have re-
fused to extradite after the most careful consideration. Such a re-
sult would be similar to the enactment of a bill of attainder or an ex
post facto law in violation of the principle contained in Article I,
section 9, clause 3 of our Constitution .... 160
In response, a proponent of the retroactivity clause pointed out
that since an extradition hearing is not a trial on the merits, no double
jeopardy problem arises. 161
The argument that the retroactivity provision in Article 5 of the
treaty is somehow unfair 162 is not persuasive. United States law is
158. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
159. 132 CONG. REC. S9147 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (comment of Sen. Lugar).
160. Id. at S9153 (remarks of Sen. D'Amato).
161. Id. at 59154 (remarks of Sen. Lugar).
162. Id. at S9254 (remarks of Sen. Kerry).
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well established that retroactivity provisions in extradition treaties do
not pose a constitutional threat. 163 In Cleugh v. Strakosch,164 the
court held that where crimes committed before the effective date of an
extradition treaty were not excluded by the terms of the treaty, the
treaty applied to such crimes as well as those subsequently
committed. 1
65
Furthermore, it seems clear that the new treaty does not amount
to an ex post facto law. An ex post facto law imposes punishment for a
crime which, at the time of its commission, was not criminal.
166
However, the Supplemental Extradition Treaty specifically provides
that no person shall be extradited for an act which, at the time of its
commission, was not criminal under the laws of both the United
Kingdom and the United States.167 Thus, there will be no extradition
under the new treaty unless the offense for which extradition is sought
was criminal when it occurred.
168
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee sought advice from the
State Department's legal counsel regarding the retroactivity clause.
In a letter dated June 23, 1986, the State Department advised the
Committee that Article 5 of the Supplemental Extradition Treaty is
"fully consistent with the U.S. Constitution, and serves important
U.S. law enforcement interests."' 169 The letter listed over twenty trea-
ties containing retroactivity provisions to which the United States is
currently a party. The letter then stated:
[y]ou asked if the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution
would be implicated by the extradition under the Supplementary
Treaty of an individual whose extradition was refused under the
earlier treaty. Double jeopardy would simply not be an issue in
such a case .... The Fifth Amendment right to be free of double
jeopardy does not attach until the individual's trial has begun. An
extradition proceeding is not a trial, but more akin to such pre-trial
proceedings as an indictment or a grand jury. These pre-trial pro-
163. See In re Giacomo, 7 F. Cas. 367 (1874) (No. 3,747), and Sabatier v. Dambrowski,
453 F. Supp. 1250, aff'd, 586 F.2d 866 (D.C.R.I. 1978).
164. Cleugh v. Strakosch, 109 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1940).
165. Id.
166. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 438 (1978).
167. Supplemental Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, art. 5, reprinted in S. EXEC. REP. 99-
17, supra note 4.
168. Id.
169. Letter to Mr. Stockman from Mary V. Mochary, Deputy Legal Advisor, United
States Department of State, dated June 23, 1986, reprinted at 132 CONG. REC. S9158 (daily ed.
July 16, 1986).
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ceedings do not implicate the right to be free from double jeopardy,
and neither does the extradition proceeding. An extradition re-
quest may be refiled at any time .... 170
Thus, the criticisms of the treaty's retroactivity provisions are
legally unsound. Furthermore, the holding of Cleugh v. Strakosch 171
indicates that even in the absence of a specific retroactivity provision,
the treaty would have retroactive application.
C. The Northern Irish Diplock Courts
A final criticism of the Supplemental Extradition Treaty has been
that by extraditing accused Provisional Irish Republican Army mem-
bers to Northern Ireland, the United States government forces them
to face an inherently unfair judicial system. 72 One senator ques-
tioned the practices of the Northern Irish Diplock courts, stating:
I am bothered by their sweeping powers of arrest, by their lack and
prohibition of jury trials, by the denial of any right to bail to
diplock court defendants, by placing the burden of proof upon the
accused offender, by the creation of new offenses unknown to the
common law, and the use of coerced confessions in the investiga-
tory process .... I decry the Diplock courts. I decry the way they
are run. I decry the abuses that are occurring .... As much as I
want to stamp out terrorism, I want to make sure that we do not
stamp out some basic legal rights as well.
173
However, treaty supporters have argued that the United States
maintains numerous treaties with nations which fail to incorporate all
the traditional rights and procedures of our own judicial system. 174
Furthermore, proponents have argued that the United States does not
confer constitutional rights on fugitives who commit acts of
terrorism. 17
5
The treaty limits the political offense doctrine, but does not aban-
don the principles upon which the doctrine was built. Article 3 of the
treaty specifically preserves protection for persons who would face un-
170. Id.
171. Cleugh v. Strakosch, 109 F.2d 330.
172. 132 CONG. REC. S9160 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (comments of Sen. Hatch).
173. Id.
174. 132 CONG. REC. S9167 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (comments of Sen. Eagleton).
175. 132 CONG. REC. S9166 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (comments of Sen. Eagleton). The
Senator stated that "[a] person has no constitutional right to commit a crime in another coun-
try and escape extradition because the crime was 'political'. The only 'right' involved is the
discretionary act of the state, if it so wishes, of its own free choice, to give political asylum for
humanitarian reasons." Id.
[Vol. 10:135
Supplemental Extradition Treaty
fair judicial procedures if extradited to the United Kingdom. 76 Arti-
cle 3(a) of the treaty states that a United States court may deny
extradition based on a persuasive showing that the person sought for
extradition would not receive a fair trial because of his or her race,
religion, nationality or political beliefs.' 7 This provision established
an affirmative right of inquiry by the United States judiciary into the
alleged abuses of the Northern Irish Diplock Court system.
The opinion of the district court in Doherty ' 7 8 contains language
that some critics of the treaty say will be used to support judicial con-
clusions that the Diplock courts are not inherently unfair. Judge
Sprizzo's opinion is the only known opinion that discusses the Irish
Diplock court system, concluding that the Northern Irish courts dis-
charge their responsibilities in a fair and just manner.' 79 However,
there are two reasons why such dicta cannot be held to mandate a
summary dismissal of the issue of impartial justice in an extradition
proceeding. First, in Doherty, Judge Sprizzo relied on the evidence
presented to him on behalf of the United Kingdom to conclude that
the Diplock system was fair. The defendant, on the other hand,
presented no contrary evidence.18 0 Second, the court "did not have
the right to launch an independent inquiry into the administration of
justice system in Northern Ireland."' 81 The new treaty confers a right
of judicial inquiry when extradition to Northern Ireland is sought in
the United States courts.' 8 2 Thus, in admitting that the Diplock
courts may indeed be subject to criticism,
[w]ith article 3(a) [the United States is] conferring upon a potential
fugitive the right to introduce evidence on the fairness of the ad-
ministration of justice system in Northern Ireland - - a right fugi-
tives [did not] enjoy under our traditional extradition law.1
83
Yet, the new treaty does not clarify just what such an inquiry
would include. Would affidavits from the accused suffice, or would
the court require testimony of persons with firsthand knowledge of
the system, such as officials of the Diplock courts, or members of out-
176. Quinn, 783 F.2d 785; see supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
178. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 132 CONG. REC. S9254 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (comments of Sen. Kerry).
182. Supplemental Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, art. 3(b), reprinted in S. EXEC. REP.
99-17, supra note 4; see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
183. 132 CONG. REC. S9254 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (comments of Sen. Kerry).
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lawed groups subject to Diplock jurisdiction? Such a searching in-
quiry might be essential to the evaluation of an entire justice
system. 1's4
V. CONCLUSION
The Supplemental Extradition Treaty Between the United States
of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland takes an important step towards a consistent and reliable defi-
nition of the term "political offense" by providing specific examples of
what activities will not qualify for the protection of that doctrine.
Furthermore, it allows the judiciary to inquire into the nature of the
judicial system that the accused will face if extradited, although the
extent to which the courts will exercise this duty remains to be seen.
In this respect, it preserves the very basis upon which the political
offense doctrine was founded-that no person should face an unfair
trial because of his or her political ideals.
The treaty is not without potential problems. By categorically
excluding certain crimes from the political offense exception, it at-
tacks the almost 200-year-old legal tradition of leaving that determi-
nation to the judiciary. Furthermore, the categorization may turn out
to be under-inclusive, over-inclusive, or both. Finally, the treaty re-
quires the judicial branch to inquire into the fairness of another judi-
cial system. The scope and nature of this inquiry remains to be seen.
The Reagan administration plans to enter into similar treaties
with other democratic nations.1 85 Thus, this treaty sets important
precedent. At the very least, this treaty makes a significant state-
ment-the United States is willing to cooperate with its allies in order
to combat violence in an age of international terrorist activity.
Terri Lee Wagner
184. A complete analysis of the Northern Irish Diplock Court System is beyond the scope
of this Comment. See generally the Northern Irish Emergency Provisions Act, 1978, chapter
5; the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978 (Continuation Order) 1980 Stat.
1st No. 1049; Foley, Public Security and Individual Freedom, supra note 6; Senate Hearing,
supra note 136 (comments of Judge Soafer and Professor Pyle).
185. Extradition Treaty Passes Senate, supra note 6.
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